


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Migrant Women, Care Work, and Women's Employment in Greece

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MIGRANT WOMEN, CARE WORK, AND WOMEN'S EMPLOYMENT IN GREECE

Antigone Lyberaki

ABSTRACT

This contribution is about women's paid and unpaid work in the context of rapid socioeconomic change in Greece between 1983 and 2008. Drawing on feminist analyses of women's employment and the care sector, it highlights the link between women's paid employment and the supply of affordable immigrant (female) labor in Greece in the sphere of care provision. It examines three issues: the acceleration of women's involvement in the paid labor force after 1990; the parallel influx of immigrants, a quarter of whom are women involved in service provision for households, into Greece; and finally, the "big picture" of the demand for care (both paid and unpaid, childcare as well as eldercare) in the context of an aging population and women's rising participation in paid work. The analysis highlights the key contribution of migrant women acting as catalysts for social change.

KEYWORDS

Women migrants, care services, elderly, women's employment, aging

JEL CODES: J16, J61, B54

INTRODUCTION

This study is about women's employment and care arrangements in Greece. It posits a causal link between women's employment and the supply of affordable female immigrant labor. Seen as economic liberation from the traditional male breadwinner–female caregiver model, the increased participation of women in the labor force may have costs attached in terms of the gender division of labor and the gender wage gap. However, it also involves benefits: jobs for migrants and rising supply of care services for families (and for women in paid employment in particular).

Through the specific example of Greece, a number of familiar, salient issues are raised. First, though there is a broad, worldwide trend for women's increasing involvement in paid work, this process is uneven and halting. Understanding not only the broad movement, but also why it may stumble or even backtrack, are important issues for analysis and policy. Over time, women's labor force participation has been linked to the way

the economy provides – or fails to provide – for care needs. Observing known interrelationships and dilemmas unfold in a possibly unfamiliar institutional setting can add to understanding. Furthermore, the feminization of migration and its links with changes in care regimes have attracted the attention of feminist economists. The intervention of migration introduces a new player in the family–state–market nexus and allows for a new balance between formal and informal provision of care. Finally, this study offers an example where changing patterns of paid work and care arrangements may lead to potential conflict between different groups of women; the issues involved need to be stated and clarified.

Greece still displays low, albeit rising, levels of women’s participation in the labor force. Although the winds of change are hard to disregard, traditional family links and gender roles appear resistant to change. More importantly, it is a country that was transformed from a source of migration to a destination in less than a decade. Hence, Greece can illustrate both the opportunities and the pitfalls of socioeconomic transformation and their gender implications.

This study focuses on the 1990s, when an acceleration in labor force entry by women coincided with the sudden and exogenous mass arrival of immigrants, caused by upheavals in Albania and the former Soviet Union in 1992 and in the Balkan Peninsula throughout the decade (John Koliopoulos and Thanos Veremis 2004). A 1998 investigation of Albanian migrants’ motives in Thessaloniki, Greece indicated that the timing and extent of this increase was unrelated to Greek domestic demand factors; instead, the migrants chose Greece because they were unable to access their preferred destinations in Western Europe (Lois Labrianidis and Antigone Lyberaki 2001). Immigrant women, by providing personal care services, facilitated the resumption of the rise in women’s labor force participation, which had shown signs of stalling. After the influx of women immigrants, care arrangements in Greece switched from exclusive (unpaid) family provision to a mixed example of the “migrant in the family model” prevalent elsewhere in the European South (Francesca Bettio, Annamaria Simonazzi, and Paola Villa 2006).¹ The answer to reconciling care responsibilities with women’s exit from the home was the “missing link” enabling women’s labor force participation to resume a strong rise.

THE COST OF WOMEN’S ECONOMIC LIBERATION: SHIFTING THE CARE BURDEN ONTO OTHER WOMEN?

Women entering the labor market have an impact on both production and consumption: their paid work contributes to GDP growth and their earnings increase households’ purchasing power, while the households’ capacity to service their own needs is reduced. Women’s labor force participation, and married women’s participation in particular, is

constrained by the nexus of women's obligations toward dependents, because the provision of care for infants and young children, the sick, and the elderly is a gendered activity.² The gradual transfer of such activities from the hidden household domain to the market has a clear liberating potential for those women who hitherto performed these tasks invisibly and with no remuneration.³ The market for care and domestic services, however, is far from homogeneous: it comprises a variety of forms ranging from regulated, formal, and visible, to highly unregulated, informal, and largely invisible. This process has been labeled the "commodification" of care, and remains a point of contention among feminists.⁴ State provision has developed in parallel with commodification, leading to a context-specific mix of family–state–market (formal–informal) provision. A number of concerns encompass quality, adequacy of supply, and the welfare implications for all types of provision. There is no theoretical presumption for the general superiority of one type of provider over the others; each case must be judged in its own context.

Delegating part of caring activities is both the result and the precondition or facilitator of women's labor force participation.⁵ It has been estimated that between the 1960s and the 1990s, the average couple in the United States was responsible for adding the equivalent of another part-time job to compensate for the reduction of time and effort spent on children and leisure (Juliet Schor 1991).⁶ The link between women's labor force participation and the emergence of jobs in personal services is clear, yet the direction of causality is less so.

Care work straddles the boundary between formal and informal, public and private, paid and unpaid work (Mary Daly and Jane Lewis 1998, 2000; Jane Lewis 2002). As a result, mainstream economic analysis approaches care work more than a little uneasily, for a number of reasons. First, care work transcends the dichotomy between the private and the public – or market-driven – spheres (and hence the market metaphor does not deliver). The same activity could also come in the shape of paid or unpaid work, thus confusing the traditional definition of work. Since the agent is not the simplistic rational, self-interested, utility maximizer (that is, the rational economic man), motives and incentives have to be worked out using more complex starting-points. Moreover, the consequentialist utilitarian calculus sits uncomfortably with issues of women's power to choose – the core of the feminist project.⁷ Given the blurring of the market and the personal spheres, there are formidable problems in defining and estimating the value of care services.⁸ In her institutionalist, non-neoclassical analysis, Barbara R. Bergmann (1986) emphasizes that norms, preferences, and values are constructed in ways that work against the interests of women as caretakers. Care work is undervalued because women perform it in the market. Bergmann (1986) blames this undervaluation problem on the collusive behavior of men in her "crowding

out hypothesis,” while Nancy Folbre (1995) sees externalities and information problems.⁹

It is widely assumed that care and domestic services suffer from William J. Baumol’s “cost disease” (1967; William J. Baumol and Alan S. Blinder 1985).¹⁰ An important characteristic of care and domestic work, which Susan Donath (2000) terms “the other economy,” is that few or no productivity gains are possible.¹¹ Precisely because productivity improvements are so difficult, the cost of care work is expected to rise faster than the cost of manufactured goods.¹² Over the long term, the difference in the growth rate of costs will make such services considerably more expensive.¹³ Demand for care services is thus constrained by the supply and also by the relative cost of care. In other words, latent demand for domestic assistance becomes effective demand only when such assistance becomes easily affordable (for a discussion of the demand and affordability of care work in the US, see Ruth Milkman, Ellen Reese, and Benita Roth [1998]). The issue of migrant labor enters the picture here (for a discussion of migrant care work in the US, see Arlie Russell Hochschild [1997]; for a broader account, see Donath [2000]; for care work and migration in Southern Europe, see Bettio, Simonazzi and Villa [2006] and Lourdes Benería [2008]).

The supply of care work is intricately linked with migrant labor, and with migrant women’s labor in particular (internal migration and transborder immigration movements). Although, historically, the supply of unpaid care was always seen as a woman’s task, this did not always hold for paid care work and domestic service. It has been argued that women came to dominate paid care only in the modern era of capitalism and industrialization (Jose C. Moya [2007] examines domestic service in Europe, the Western Hemisphere, Africa, Australia, India, and Japan from early modernity to the present; Antoinette Fauve-Chamoux [2005] analyzes domestic service in the formation of European identity). Hence, as Raffaella Sarti argues with respect to Europe, “in the early modern times domestic service was a matter (widely) of age. In the 19th–20th century it evolved into a matter of (age) class and gender and, in the last few decades, into one of (class, gender and) nationality” (2005: 10). Although expected to “wither away” with the maturing of capitalism, and while its share in total employment has been shrinking for many decades, this activity shows signs of revival and remains today at the crossroads of important themes such as migration, gender inequalities, and informal work as well as the relationship between the family and the state (Sarti 2005: 1).

Some reasons for hiring a domestic worker – including the need to participate in paid work or care for dependents – are common across societies past and present. Similarly, the reasons for taking up a job in domestic service have always been linked to the alternative job opportunities. In the past, many women had few alternatives for

employment. Even today, in the case of migrants, domestic service may be the only option to enter employment while guaranteeing some basic living arrangements. Increasing global inequalities have triggered a revival in the numbers of domestic workers in rich countries. Interestingly, this partly reverses the long-term trend of proletarianization. Today, paid domestic workers are not all proletarians; some highly educated middle-class people take up that kind of work, while it is not uncommon for a domestic worker to be better educated than her employer (for a discussion of this dynamic in the US, see Arlie Russell Hochschild [2000]; on Filipina women in Rome and in Los Angeles, see Rhacel Salazar Parreñas [2001]; on Europe between the sixteenth and the twentieth centuries, see Sarti [2005]). In contrast to the past, today even lower-class Europeans can employ some kind of domestic help.

There is little doubt that immigrant women's labor is poorly paid and is often performed under difficult conditions.¹⁴ Do some women gain the potential to be liberated at unacceptable costs for other women? Are the traps more important than the opportunities? Who pays, who benefits, and by how much? What are the chances for upward mobility (if any)? In what follows, these open questions are discussed in a specific context of Greece from 1983 to 2008.

WOMEN IN THE LABOR FORCE: EXPLAINING THE PATTERN OF WOMEN'S EMPLOYMENT IN GREECE 1983–2008

Women's employment in Greece experienced a sea change from the early 1980s to 2008. In the course of that period, labor force participation, though still low by European standards, increased by 50 percent. Given that at the same time women's unpaid work in family-run businesses (in small enterprises and in agriculture) also declined, the increase in women's effective choice was even more remarkable. It is also noteworthy that the increase followed a particular S-shaped pattern, with a spurt occurring in the period 1992–2004 and relative stability at either end.

It is the premise of this study that these developments can be explained by considering the effect of the sudden availability of affordable paid care services provided by immigrant women who arrived in large numbers from 1992 onward. While women's labor force participation had shown signs of stagnation at the end of the 1980s in spite of equality legislation, the arrival of immigrant domestic workers made it possible for the large numbers of Greek women, who had been prevented from joining paid work due to care responsibilities, to work outside the home. Immigrant women make it possible for women's labor force participation to rise strongly.

In the absence of time series evidence and direct observation in the form of time-use surveys, examination of this claim must necessarily proceed

indirectly, employing so-called “naked eye” evidence. This section first attempts to set down the stylized facts about women’s labor force participation in terms of the groups affected and the time patterns involved. Then it examines whether the standard explanations for labor force participation changes could account for the observed effects. To this end, I examine macroeconomic and structural developments, including *inter alia* a meta-analysis of econometric studies. And last, the discussion attempts to zero in on the link between childcare and women’s participation in paid work. The argument here attributes the direction of causality running from care availability to participation by observing that public and private (formal) sector childcare facilities account for a very small part of the demand and care services were provided as a result of the arrival of immigrant women.

THE STYLIZED FACTS OF WOMEN’S LABOR FORCE PARTICIPATION

Figure 1 shows the development of women’s labor force participation in Greece from 1983 (the start of the Labor Force Survey [LFS] series) to 2008. The rise is from 41.1 percent in 1983 to 59.2 percent in 2008. This figure may be low when compared with the equivalent figure for EU-27 (67.9 percent), and is halfway between Spain (66.7 percent) and Italy (55.1 percent); yet represents a 16-point gain (or 44 percent) in the space of a generation. Notably, almost all the change occurred in the twelve year period from 1993 to 2004. The 1980s show hesitant gains, which after 1988–9, were even reversed. Similarly, after 2004, participation seems to have reached a plateau. Thus the pattern of women’s employment that this study




Figure 1 Labor market activity rates of women in Greece age 20–64, 1983–2008
Source: Eurostat (1983–2008).

seeks to explain shows hesitant (or no) growth until 1992, followed by a vigorous rise during the period from 1993 to 2004, and a plateau thereafter.

Turning to the situation by age group, Figure 2 breaks down the percentage units of increase by age group for the three subperiods identified. Indeed, the percentage points gained per annum in the middle period are three times the size of changes in the other two periods. The situation appears to be different at the points of entry and exit in the labor market. Increasing numbers of women in the 20–24 age group continued on to tertiary education, especially after 1999. Similarly, the group older than 50 is primarily affected by developments linked to women's pensions and other social security issues culminating in a reversal of downward trends by a gradual steady rise (see Platon Tinios [2003]). For all other groups, the changes of the middle period are sustained and larger than either of the periods before or after.

A large part of the explanation of the overall change has to do with cohort effects. Women born after the 1950s have lived more of their lives in a less patriarchal or overtly discriminatory environment, have sought more education, and can be expected to treat employment and a career as part of their identity.¹⁵ Indeed, Figure 3 traces the labor market experience of five age cohorts through the period covered by the analysis. We see that each cohort enters the labor market at a higher participation rate (most evident at age 30–34), which is maintained as the cohort ages.

Thus the cross-sectional participation curve shifts upward between 1991 and 2006 roughly uniformly at the prime ages; there is a tendency for slightly higher growth in the 35–50 age bracket, which can be thought to be more established in the labor market. Nevertheless, careful observation of Figure 3 shows that each cohort after 1991 rises faster than its predecessor




Figure 2 Women's labor market activity rates by age group; percentage units rise per annum




Figure 3 Married women's labor market activity rates by birth cohort, 1983-2006

at the same age range five years previously (the line segments following the mark "O" are steeper than for the cohort line below it).

Concluding this impressionistic overview, the key force behind this change is undoubtedly the powerful secular cohort effect. This, as in other Mediterranean countries, creates the background and preconditions for large potential rises in participation. Exactly when these pent-up pressures surface depends on other conditions. There appeared to be a mechanism that first constrained rises in participation in the mid 1980s and then freed them again after 1992. Such a mechanism should explain the periodization that starkly characterizes Figure 2.

What can this mechanism be? One could think of "conventional" determinants of labor force participation that could account for the behavior and time pattern of labor force participation trends. However, with only twenty-five years of aggregate data and considering that participation is likely to be subject to complex lagged effects, a full and conclusive econometric treatment is clearly out of the question. Moreover, survey information is limited in quality and is available for only a small subsample of the period. We are thus denied the luxury of fully specified econometric or microdata models and are by necessity limited to a qualitative, impressionistic critical overview of the available partial data. For instance, real GDP growth and real wage change could be considered possible explanations for the observed participation rate pattern: growth rates were very unstable through 1995 and were replaced by steady growth lasting to 2007. Though one could conceive how instability could stall participation increases, sustained growth started after the rise in

participation was well underway. Similarly, the greater openness of the Greek economy, which was associated with the shrinking of the agricultural labor force and rise of tourism, could explain the general trend, though not the timing.

On the supply side, educational change can account for the secular change but not its time pattern. Theory might point us in the direction of the growth in minimum wages; yet the fact that they rose in the early 1980s and then once again after 2002 could account for changes only with a very unlikely lag pattern. Similarly, wage gaps remained constant (Ioannis Cholezas and Panos Tsakoglou 2006), as did taxation, so these factors do not work as explanations. Turning to institutional change, public and European Union-funded policy initiatives for equality were confined to legal rhetoric and showcase programs with no lasting effect beyond immediate beneficiaries (Antigone Lyberaki 2009b), while some modest reconciliation policies were introduced only well into the 2000s (Maria Karamessini 2005).¹⁶ Social protection developments over this period were absorbed by pensions; family policy and childcare started late and from a very low base, and could hardly account for larger social change.¹⁷

Thus the proximate determinants that suggest themselves, examined one by one, are unsatisfactory in explaining the pattern of change or its timing. With a limited degree of freedom, there is little doubt that a clever combination of factors with elaborate lag structures could be brought to describe past experience. Whether such a course would constitute an explanation of the behavior of women's labor force participation is, however, anyone's guess.

What does explain this syncopated rise? There remains to be considered a factor closely related to labor market entry on the part of women – namely, care services for children. Figure 4, derived from the European Community Household Panel (ECHP; Eurostat 1995–2001), is a scatter plot of the association between the percent of mothers with children under 12 in paid employment and the percentage of households with children under age 12 who receive paid childcare.¹⁸ It also reports evidence for 2004 based on the successor of the ECHP, the Survey of Income and Living Conditions (EU-SILC; Eurostat 2004b). The low levels of mothers of children under age 12 in paid employment (below 10 percent in 2001 and just above 11 percent in 2004) may be due to coverage issues, referring only to specialized childcare, rather than home help or other nonspecialized care. If, as is most likely, this indicator is standing in for a wider (unmeasured) total, then it would be rates of change rather than levels that provide the explanation.¹⁹ This interpretation explains the apparent closeness of the scatter association. It is mirrored by an equally close relationship between domestic responsibilities and the percentage of women who state that they are inactive due to family obligations.²⁰ In the context of the dearth of public childcare facilities, the mother's decision to




Figure 4 Percentages of mothers in paid employment and households receiving paid childcare, 1996–2001

Note. Estimates for 1996–2001 are based on ECHP (Eurostat 1995–2001) data for Greece. Estimates for 2004 are based on EU-SILC (Eurostat 2004b).

get a job is almost synonymous with obtaining help with care.²¹ The two decisions are effectively simultaneous.

Nevertheless, there is indirect econometric evidence that the presence of children was a considerably less potent factor in inhibiting women's labor force participation in the 1990s than it was a decade earlier, in Greece. Costas N. Kanellopoulos and Kostas G. Mavromaras (2002) estimate the same probit participation model for Household Budget Surveys (HBS) in 1988 and in 1994. The marginal effect of children (under age 6) drops from -0.176 in 1988 to -0.067 six years later. Studies using 1980s data consistently estimate child effects near the top range of this estimate (see, for example, Costas Meghir, Yannis Ioannides, and Christopher Pissarides [1989]), while those after 1994 near the bottom range (for example, Ioanna Daouli, Michael Demoussis and Nicholas Giannakopoulos [2004] using 1998 HBS children $<13 = -0.086$, and Daphne Nicolitsas [2006] for 2001 using ECHP -0.078). In order to test this finding and to describe the data, I estimated a simple probit model of participation of married women using ECHP, employing a model similar to Nicolitsas's (2006) for the years 1995 and 2001 that is reported in the Appendix. The emphasis was placed on estimating the total effect of children as a key factor in determining the demand for childcare; the presence of preschool-age children is flagged by appropriate dummy variables. The probit equations reproduce these findings, both regarding the magnitude of the effects and the differences between the 2 years.²² In order to illustrate these findings, predicted probabilities of the two estimates for selected cases of women with and without children appear in Table 1.

MIGRANT WOMEN, CARE WORK, AND WOMEN'S EMPLOYMENT

Table 1 Predicted probit probabilities for participation in the labor market (%)

	Predicted probability of participation		Reduction in participation probability relative to no child	
	1995	2001	1995	2001
<i>Married woman, ages 30–44, with:</i>				
<i>Secondary education, no child</i>	55.7	60.6	-	-
<i>Secondary education, with one child age <6</i>	42.3	55.9	13.4	4.7
<i>Secondary education, with two children at least one of them age <6 years</i>	38.7	48.5	17.0	12.1
<i>Tertiary education, no child</i>	77.4	89.2	-	-
<i>Tertiary education, with one child age <6</i>	69.1	87.3	8.3	1.9
<i>Tertiary education, with two children at least one of them age <6 years</i>	64.6	82.8	12.8	6.4

Source: Eurostat (1995–2001; estimates in Appendix 1).

The arrival of a child leads to a large reduction in the predicted probability, which is compounded when there are two or more children, as long as one of them is preschool age. The important finding is that the estimated effect in 2001 is a fraction of that of 1995, corroborating the impression derived from the econometric literature. Taking these results together, the picture emerging is that in the later period, the care of preschool-age children is becoming less of a binding constraint than previously. Equally, participation appears far more elastic as regards the level of education, as witnessed by a 30-point difference between secondary and tertiary education. Since education both captures cohort effects and also serves as a permanent income proxy, its effect could be seen as a signal for greater capacity to afford childcare services.

The final stage of the argument is to suggest a reason why childcare would be less of a problem after 1992 rather than before. The explanation proffered here has to do with the effect of the sudden arrival after 1992 of large numbers of immigrant women who supplied child and eldercare services as well as domestic support. As mentioned earlier, this sudden and fortuitous rise in immigrant numbers was due to political and military developments in the Balkans and the former Soviet Union (especially in the Caucasus), combined with Greece's porous northern and island borders (Koliopoulos and Veremis 2004). Care services were beyond the budget capacity of even higher middle-class families in the 1980s; the arrival of migrants reduced the cost of childcare and allowed the pent-up demand of the 1980s to surface after 1992. Moreover, the initial arrival of immigrants

was unrelated to the existence of latent demand for care in the Greek market – the inaugurating causal structure is clearly recursive. Once immigrants were in place in large numbers and a market for their services had developed, network effects could reinforce the process (Charalambos Kasimis and Apostolos G. Papadopoulos 2005; Antigone Lyberaki, Anna Triandafyllidou, Marina Petroni, and Rudy Gropas 2008).

WOMEN'S IMMIGRATION TO GREECE: NUMBERS, JOBS, AND WAGES

Migration to Greece is relatively recent. For most of the last century, Greece was somewhere people emigrated from. This was reversed sharply at the beginning of the 1990s. The great majority of migrants came from neighboring Balkan countries, though economic migrants and asylum seekers have also been arriving from Eastern Europe, the former USSR, the Middle East, and Asian and African countries.²³

In the 2001 Census, the reported stock of foreigners living in Greece was 762,200, amounting to approximately 7 percent of the total population (Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development 2004).²⁴ Officially, they account for 9.5 percent of employed workers in Greece. Their actual share may be closer to 12 percent, as they are undercounted in the LFS due to both sampling problems and fear of harassment (Jennifer Cavounidis 2006). This large infusion of migrant labor affected neither labor force participation nor unemployment rates for indigenous men. It is strongly associated, however, with the increase in women's employment. Theodore Lianos's (2003) econometric analysis used LFS data by region for 1998–2001, and concluded that an increase of 1 percent in migration to a region was accompanied by a 2.5 percent increase in women's labor force participation.²⁵ Lianos noted the statistical association, but did not speculate as to the causal mechanism at work.

In 2001 women made up 45.5 percent of all immigrants in Greece according to the official data (National Statistical Service of Greece 2001). Their involvement in the informal sector, however, in notoriously underreported activities (such as services to the households) may add gender bias in the official records.²⁶ Immigrant women participate in the labor market at slightly higher rates than Greek women (58.8 versus 54.8 percent for the 15–68 age group), though far less than their male counterparts (89.6 percent). So, the immigrant gender gap is analogous to that of the indigenous population. The same applies to the gender wage gap: it is persistent and wide. Figure 5 shows that immigrant women's wages are relatively low and near the statutory minimum wage for the economy as a whole. It is worthy of note that immigrant men's wages are comparable to indigenous women's. The fact that migrant women tend to be employed in the hidden sphere of the informal or unregulated economy creates a nexus




Figure 5 Median monthly wage of employees by gender and minimum monthly wage, Greeks and migrants, 2005 (€/month)

Sources: Median monthly wage based on EU-SILC (Eurostat 2005), for full-time equivalence; minimum monthly wages for 2004 based on Eurostat Earnings Database (2004a).

of dangers as well as opportunities. On the one hand, their access to the officially defined social protection schemes remains problematic due to insufficient social insurance contributions (access to social security and healthcare, though not to childcare facilities).²⁷ On the other hand, informality evades bureaucracy and offers tax- and contributions-free earnings. Hence the paradox: middle-aged women whose previous experience in Eastern Europe was one of rigid regulation are confronted with the attractions of a “culture of informality.” Such attractions make these women often reluctant to regularize their status when the chance arises (Iordanis Psimmenos and Christoforos Skamnakis 2008).

The care and domestic service sector provides a point of entry into the labor market for many women (internal migrants in the past, foreign born today).²⁸ Without underplaying the hierarchical and vulnerability-related issues, it would be condescending to see immigrant women in the hidden domestic economy as mere passive victims. Contribution evasion is extremely widespread among all workers in a position to evade, largely due to the lack of incentives for social insurance.²⁹ However, even in cases where the employer imposes informality, migrant domestic workers (in stark contrast to trafficked women) are active agents who are in a position to affect and bargain over the pace and the content of their work. Bearing in mind the laxity of enforcement of labor laws in the informal small industry sector, immigrant irregular workers are not qualitatively different

from their indigenous co-workers. The development of a personal relationship with the family for whom they perform care work enhances satisfaction and self-esteem (Efthymios Papataxiarchis, Penelope Topali, and Angeliki Athanasopoulou 2008; Psimmenos and Skamnakis 2008). In a society based on a network of personal relations in which who you know is often of decisive importance, such connections may offer a “way in” to the system. The domestic care sector may offer better chances for upward mobility for some migrants (in the same or different line of activity); while for others, it involves moving “backwards” to inactivity as soon as the economic situation of their family permits them to become “housewives again.”³⁰ Both these trajectories are relevant in the case of migrant women in Greece (Antigone Lyberaki and Thanos Maroukis 2005; Helen Kambouri 2007; Angeliki Athanasopoulou 2008).

Who employs migrant caregivers and domestic workers? The impressionistic picture drawn from recent micro studies suggests that the typical employer tends to be a highly educated and middle-class woman, usually in paid work with a salaried job in the formal sector or a profession such as medicine or law, between 35 and 55 years of age (Kambouri 2007; Koula Kassimati 2007; Papataxiarchis, Topali, and Athanasopoulou 2008).³¹ She delegates childcare, eldercare, and household tasks due of mounting pressures on her own time.³² The wage magnitudes of Figure 5 imply that the median aspiring labor market entrant, if she were to employ the median immigrant woman, may – in net of tax terms – be better off by something in the region of €260. If full social insurance contributions are levied (an unlikely event for this sector of employment), that figure would be reduced to €150, which gives the minimum financial gain. If, on the other hand, the employer gets an informal sector job herself (free of both tax and contributions), the financial gain may be greater but still modest. Elementary cost–benefit analysis shows that it is only the better off that can afford to employ full-time home help, while part-time hiring, possibly combined with part-time employment for them, may often be the first preference of women employers. However, once nonfinancial criteria, such as autonomy, social networking, and independence from patriarchal authority are considered, the decision to get a paid job may become more attractive.

THE CARE SECTOR IN GREECE: FROM FAMILY PROVISION TO THE “MIGRANT IN THE FAMILY” MODEL

The provision of personal care across Europe varies with labor market and welfare state regimes (Bettio, Simonazzi, and Villa 2006; Benería 2008). In Greece, as in Italy and Spain, the management of care for both children and the elderly is delegated almost entirely to the family (Manos Mataganis 2000; Francesca Bettio and Janneke Plantenga 2004; Kevin

Featherstone and Platon Tinios 2006). This was not always the case. In the 1950s and 1960s, middle-class families employed domestic helpers (internal migrant women from rural Greece). This practice reinforced the idea that care was women's work but, in sharp contrast to the later period, these paid care workers were not employed by women in order to aid their own entry into paid labor. Figure 6 illustrates that the burden of caring throughout Europe still weighs heavily on women, though nowhere more than in Southern Europe and in Greece. Even in dual-earner households, if there is a child below 3 years of age, women devote almost ten times more time to childcare – an asymmetry yet more pronounced in housework and care for frail adults (Haris Symeonidou, George Mitsopoulos, and Katerina Vezyrgianni 2001).

It is this care burden that is being gradually delegated to immigrant women. In the dual-earner model, families “put out” part of the caring functions and attempt to maximize the family money inflows.

As we saw earlier, family and informal networks play a crucial role in childcare. About 22 percent of the households with children under the age of 12 receive regular childcare (14 percent unpaid and 8 percent paid in 2001, based on Eurostat's (1995–2001) 2001 ECHP). As shown by the Survey of Health, Ageing, and Retirement in Europe (SHARE 2004) data on the population over 50 years of age, older people mind their grandchildren everywhere in Europe, but the intensity or frequency is much higher in Greece (and in Italy and Spain) than in the Continental and Nordic countries, as illustrated by Table 2.³³




Figure 6 Women's share in care activities in the EU, 2001

Note. Caregivers are defined as adults devoting ≥ 2 hours daily to care for children or other persons.

Source. Estimates based on ECHP 2001 (Eurostat 1995–2001).

Table 2 Looking after grandchildren by persons over age 50, 2004

Percent of persons (%) who looked after their grandchildren (under 10 years of age) regularly or occasionally

<i>Country group</i>	<i>Total (50+)</i>	<i>50–64</i>	<i>65–74</i>	<i>75+</i>	<i>Frequency of caregiving Almost daily</i>
<i>Nordic</i>	64.3	72.0	66.3	21.7	3.4
<i>Continental Europe</i>	56.0	64.9	54.3	24.8	14.8
<i>Southern Europe</i>	46.6	52.7	50.3	21.7	46.8
<i>Greece</i>	58.1	71.8	57.4	23.1	43.2
<i>All</i>	53.6	62.1	53.9	23.4	22.9

Note. Sample is restricted to persons over age 50 with at least one grandchild younger than 10.

Source. Calculations based on SHARE (2004).

Public daycare provision is scant in Greece. Though there has been progress since 2000, there remains considerable unmet demand,³⁴ served initially by informal networks (Symeonidou, Mitsopoulos, and Vezyrgianni 2001; Maria Karamessini 2007). The balance between paid and unpaid care is, nevertheless, changing: according to Eurostat's (1995–2001) ECHP data, between 1995 and 2001 the share of paid childcare provision rose from 23 to 38 percent.

The late but accelerating transition of Greek women into paid employment generated demand for childcare, which came up against the cohort of grandmothers with fuller careers and fewer children. Thus the supply of free grandmother-provided care was falling. For those who could afford to hire migrant women, they filled the emerging care gap just in time.

The same mechanism applied to eldercare. Aging triggers a growing demand for eldercare in a welfare system where care is almost exclusively family based.³⁵ Greece had the lowest institutional provisions – community and residential care – for the elderly in the 1990s.³⁶ As the private market is underdeveloped and the chronic shortages in public services remain, informal networks fulfill an important role, as in Italy (Bettio, Simonazzi, and Villa 2006). Table 3 illustrates the prevalence of informal arrangements in care provision for the elderly (over 75 years of age).³⁷

It appears, thus, that provision of care for the elderly is nine times more likely to be met via informal networks than through the market. The outlook for families regarding care is bleak due to increasing life expectancy, diminishing family size, and increasing women's labor force participation. The views prevailing in society stress the primary responsibility of families to provide care (see Table 4), which is already being reinterpreted to include the supervision of care by persons outside the family. Thus, the family evolves from exclusive provider to a care supervisor. Prevailing views could accommodate the use of services by migrants, in the context of what came to be called "the migrant in the

MIGRANT WOMEN, CARE WORK, AND WOMEN'S EMPLOYMENT

Table 3 Proportion of the population over age 75 receiving personal care, by income class in Greece, 2004

<i>Provider of personal care</i>	<i>Total</i>	<i>Poorest 25%^a</i>	<i>Middle 50%^b</i>
Family, relatives, or friends	12.9	15.5	12.6
Combination of family and private services	1.9	2.1	1.9
Private services	1.4	0.6	2.3
None (received no personal care)	83.8	81.8	83.3
<i>Total</i>	<i>100</i>	<i>100</i>	<i>100</i>

Note: ^a“Poorest 25%” refers to the bottom 25 percent of the equivalent income distribution. ^b“Middle 50%” stands for the second and the third quartile of the equivalent income distribution.

Source: Calculations based on SHARE (2004).

Table 4 Whose responsibility should personal care provision be? Views of people age 50 and over in Greece, 2004

<i>Type of care</i>	<i>Totally family</i>	<i>Mainly family</i>	<i>Both equally</i>	<i>Mainly state</i>	<i>Totally state</i>
<i>Help with household chores for older persons who are in need such as help with cleaning, washing</i>	14.7	38.2	34.6	8.5	4.1
<i>Personal care for older persons who are in need such as nursing or help with bathing or dressing</i>	24.7	41.2	25.4	5.4	3.2

Source: Calculations based on SHARE (2004).

family” model (Aris Sissouras, Maria Ketssetzopoulou, Nikos Bouzas, Evi Fagadaki, Olga Papaliou, and Aliki Fakoura 2002; Bettio, Simonazzi, and Villa 2006; Karamessini 2007).

In the 1950s–60s, part of the demand for care was met by the internal migration of young women who migrated from rural areas. In 1971 housemaids accounted for 5.6 percent of total women in employment, while in the urban areas they exceeded 12 percent of the total (National Statistical Service of Greece 1971). As elsewhere, this type of worker disappeared as Greece ascended the development ladder. By the 1980s, long-term care needs were met at a very high cost by a labor force composed of retired nurses, active nurses (after hours), and middle-aged Greek women who had received political asylum in Eastern Europe as a result of their involvement in the Greek Civil War between 1946 and 1949 (Koliopoulos and Veremis 2004). A few well-off families employed Filipinas. Obtaining care in this way was expensive as long as women in the family

performed it for free. In this context, immigrant women were absorbed in domestic and care services most readily. After less than seven to eight years of large-scale immigration, more than 50 percent of immigrant women are involved in domestic service (National Statistical Service of Greece 2001). Similarly the share of migrants working in the provision of services to households is very high in Greece (20.5 percent of the total, against less than 2 percent in the UK and a mere 1.2 percent in the US), both for urban and rural households.³⁸ Thus the interpretation that migrants stepped in to fill a preexisting gap of unmet demand is largely confirmed.

While foreign women deliver care and household services to Greek families, they also have to find solutions to their own demand for care. Women from the former Soviet Union tend to leave their families home (or their children are grown up). Alternatively, Filipinas and Albanians often have their children with them. The new trend among Filipina mothers of young children is to continue to be employed as live-ins and entrust their children as boarders under the care of other compatriots for five days a week at affordable cost (Antigone Lyberaki 2009a).³⁹ Thus, migrant women – some of whom may live in, while others have their own living arrangements – provide for part of the Greek family’s caring needs.

From the point of view of immigrants supplying services, there are several advantages to these employment arrangements. Informality allows immigrant women to combine full- and part-time paid work. Employers provide housing and food and take care of other living expenses for live-in helpers. Greek care work wages compare favorably with average earnings in the source countries. Since 2002 Greece’s use of the appreciating euro increased its attraction. As conditions of work vary, so does remuneration. Longer-established ethnic niches (such as Filipinas) are paid more than recently arrived Albanians, Ukrainians, or Russians. Stability of employment and length of stay also vary, as different migrant groups have their own distinct migration projects (Antigone Lyberaki et al. 2008).⁴⁰

From the point of view of the employers, the issue of affordability is of paramount importance. Evidence from the EU-SILC (Eurostat 2005) suggests that the average wage for paid eldercare workers is roughly half the cost of the cheaper variants of assisted “institutionalized” living.⁴¹ The low wages of domestic workers were the reason behind the introduction in 1998 of a new lower social insurance contribution class for domestic work.⁴²

What, then, is the big picture of families delegating care functions in Greece today? The available evidence on paid caregivers and migrant women providing personal services to households suggests that delegating care offers a safety valve to mounting pressures for care. While Greek female employers tend to view migrants’ work as “auxiliary” or “supplementary” to their own role, migrant workers dispute this and suggest that they are the main providers (Kambouri 2007). These tensions

need not be taken to imply that the task of supervising domestic workers has become gender neutral. Hence, it seems that a new complex division of labor is emerging whereby indigenous women increasingly specialize in coordination and supervision while the hands-on caring tasks are entrusted to the paid domestic worker.

Estimating the size of the latent demand for services to households or measuring the actual incidence of delegating of services is very difficult, if not impossible. Rough calculations suggest that as many as 15–20 percent of all urban households may have recourse to the assistance of migrant workers.⁴³ In any case, the unobserved demand of today is expected to surface into real effective demand in the future. This new effective demand may be supplied by the formal tax-paying economy or may remain within the ambit of the grey informal sector. In either case, the effect on labor force participation will be substantial.

The question remains whether the “migrant in the family” model will persist in the long term. As the number of migrants tends to stabilize, their wages will continue to rise. The number of live-in migrants may decline in the future, while an increasing number of households will continue to delegate (albeit at higher costs). The key element will be the role of the state, whether as direct provider or market regulator. So long as the state remains absent, current trends will persist. As the informal market becomes entrenched, there are likely to be pressures to transform it from within. Wages are likely to increase and conditions to improve, while entrepreneurial schemes (networks of minders and cleaners under the informal coordination of an immigrant with good connections and reputation) may expand further.

Demographic, socioeconomic, and value-related factors point toward a continued rise in the demand for the provision of services to households. Public finance and the unsolved public pension problems will restrict the capacity of the formal welfare system to deal further with care needs (Platon Tinios 2005). In this context, delegating care will, as in the past, remain an answer. The solution immigrants provide may be private and informal; it may rest on ethnic and gender divisions; it may even “recycle” women’s tasks among women. But, and if women’s retreat back into the home and to their previous “pre-delegating” status is deemed undesirable and/or unrealistic, immigrants will still offer a workable solution.

CONCLUSION

The starting-point of this paper was the observation that women’s labor force participation in Greece shifted gears in the 1990s. In the last 30 years, education, equality legislation, rising incomes, and cultural transformations powered a steady rise in female employment rates. The rise faltered in the late 1980s as women were torn between their own inclinations and their

responsibilities of care for others. These opposing forces are reconciled in the “hidden” economy of care, which was the focus of this paper. A way out of the dilemma was provided in Greece by the labor supply shock provided by immigrant women, who provided plentiful and inexpensive care services. Women’s participation in the labor market resumed its upward path and made up for lost time.

Migrant labor was strongly complementary to indigenous women’s participation, an effect more accentuated due to the rigid, dual labor market. Women’s employment was boosted in three ways. First, entry into paid employment was facilitated. The withdrawal of women from positions as unpaid helpers in the family or in small family businesses had a double effect: it increased labor supply for the formal labor market at the same time as it increased demand for labor in the informal care market. Second, the pressure on mothers of young children to leave employment was weakened (fewer career interruptions). And, third, the pressure on women to use early retirement schemes in order to care for husbands, elderly parents, and other relatives was weakened and early retirement of women in their 50s was delayed. In social terms, these effects went hand-in-hand with micro-level transformations in care provision, from the “family model” to the “migrant in the family” arrangement.

How to assess these developments in welfare terms? Greek families delegating caring were obvious gainers. At a time of rising incomes, migrant women filled the growing gaps in care, which, as in some other advanced countries, were met neither by social protection nor the formal labor market. In the case of Greece, a strong argument can be made for a further, doubly liberating potential: indigenous women leave the patriarchal family behind, while the immigrant women who help them do it increase their own income and safeguard their own position in their own families.

The road to women’s emancipation is long, intricate, and in some cases indirect. However, Greek women appear to owe much of their progress in the last two decades to their sisters, the immigrant *deae ex machina* of care provision.

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NOTES

- ¹ The migrant in the family model refers to the transformation of the traditional family model of care into a new complex division of labor in which family caregivers (mainly women) provide the coordination, while the task of minding is entrusted to immigrant women (in Bettio, Simonazzi, and Villa [2006]; also in Francesca Bettio and Giovanni Solinas [2009]; finally as "migrant-carer model" in Annamaria Simonazzi [2009]).
- ² The definition of caring labor and the analysis of its economic implications are open to debate (Paula England 2005). Here, I use the term in its narrow sense as referring to specific activities (childcare and eldercare). I do not define it with reference to a caring motive. (In Nancy Folbre [1995], caring labor is undertaken out of affection or a sense of responsibility for other people, with no expectation of immediate pecuniary reward.)
- ³ Women's economic autonomy involves changes in their unpaid activities as caregivers (Ann Shola Orloff 1993; Alice Kessler-Harris 2001).
- ⁴ Deirdre McCloskey (1996) takes a view against commodification. Julie A. Nelson (1999) adopts a more balanced position, while Paula England and Nancy Folbre (1999) point out the main difficulties of the actual markets both on the demand and the supply side of care.
- ⁵ The verb "to delegate," with its connotations of not ceding responsibility, conveys the essence of the process more accurately than "outsourcing," which expresses similar strategies in the field of small enterprises.
- ⁶ The same phenomenon has been described in negative terms as parenting deficit (Amitai Etzioni 1993) or "abandonment" syndrome (Jeremy Rifkin 1995: 234). Nevertheless, Nancy Folbre and Julie A. Nelson (2000) cite evidence from W. Keith Bryant and Cathleen D. Zick (1996a, 1996b) to argue that delegation may have actually increased the amount of time parents spend per child, as families purchase more services allowing more time with children.
- ⁷ Amartya Sen (2009) reviews the philosophical arguments eloquently.
- ⁸ Should one place a value on caring? Pro-market feminists refrain from demanding direct state payments for homework and childrearing for fear that they will oblige more women to stay at home or that the value society imputes to non-market care will fall (Barbara R. Bergmann 1986). Nelson is concerned that if support for parenting is seen as payment, it would imply that children are seen as commodities; whereas if it is seen as compensation, then children will be conceptualized as a burden (from personal communication with Nancy Folbre, cited in Folbre 1995: 87 and 1995: 89, footnote 49). Other feminists defending non-market institutions are in favor of parental support schemes (Nancy Folbre 1994, 1995).
- ⁹ Bergmann (1986) describes the development of a sexual caste system based on the enforcement of gendered norms of behavior.
- ¹⁰ For a feminist critique of the notion of "cost," see Susan Donath (2000) and Susan Himmelweit (2005).
- ¹¹ Attempts to improve productivity by reducing the amount of time or personal contact merely reduce the quality (Donath 2000).
- ¹² In view of the productivity increases in services since 1985, the "cost disease" approach seems dated. Although the required quantity of care work may not decline as a result of new technologies, the quality of care may well improve (for example, aid for handicapped people, housing modifications, and information technology all increase "productivity" of care).
- ¹³ This does not mean that care services will be eclipsed due to rising cost. In Baumol and Blinder's view, as productivity increases elsewhere, priorities must be reevaluated; "If we value services sufficiently, we can have more and

- better services – at some sacrifice in the rate of growth of manufactured goods’ (1985: 547).
- ¹⁴ Barbara Ehrenreich and Arlie Russell Hochschild (2002) adopt a worldwide perspective and cover experiences of migrant domestic workers in the US, Filipina workers in Hong Kong, and female immigrants in Taiwan; Rebeca Raijman, Silvina Schammah-Gesser, and Adriana Kemp (2003) examine Latina migrants in Israel; Christina Ho (2006) presents experiences of Chinese women in Australia; while Sara R. Curran, Steven Shafer, Katharine M. Donato, and Filiz Garip (2006) and Mignon Duffy (2007) focus on the US context.
- ¹⁵ Claudia Goldin (2006) has charted this process for the US from the late nineteenth century. Antigone Lyberaki, Platon Tinios, and George Papadoudis (2011) examine a panel survey of women over age 50 and chart different national cohort experiences in labor force participation, contrasting the North and South of Europe.
- ¹⁶ Reconciliation policies form a relatively new area of social policy in Greece, whose impact in raising women’s participation in paid employment remains marginal (Karamessini 2005). They still target only women. The responsibility for funding rests with employers and the state and local authorities, none of which put reconciliation outcomes in their priority list. The coverage of preschool childcare is still very limited, and what exists suffers from short operating hours that do not match business hours. Tax deductions and child benefits remain low and fail to make an impact. Leave facilities are limited (except in the public sector), while part-time work is very unpopular with the unions, which have so far been effective in banning it even from the public dialogue. The same goes for working-time flexibility.
- ¹⁷ More detailed qualitative examination of each of thirteen possible macro, micro, and institutional explanations is available from the author upon request.
- ¹⁸ The ECHP was a rolling panel survey devised by the European Commission to assess standard of living, and it was subsequently used to compose indicators of social inclusion for the EU. It was designed as a pilot project and was discontinued and replaced in 2004 by the EU-SILC. Despite its many acknowledged shortcomings, the ECHP is the only regular survey covering the period 1995–2001. For the importance of the ECHP and EU-SILC for the formulation of EU social inclusion policy, see Tony Atkinson, Bea Cantillon, Eric Marlier, and Brian Nolan (2002).
- ¹⁹ Other possible reasons may be underreporting of irregular caregivers, which might be due to the fear of the authorities. Infelicities in the ECHP sampling or questionnaire could also play a role (for instance, domestic help and eldercare are excluded). The supply of paid eldercare may have knock-on effects, enabling older family members to help with small children. If the interpretation of rates of change holds, the apparent mismatch between the levels of paid childcare recorded, on the one hand, and the number of labor entrants, on the other, is explainable.
- ²⁰ The strong link between the prevailing care arrangements and labor market behavior of women is substantiated by the high proportion of nonactive women (ages 25–59) because of care responsibilities (39 percent in 1996 according to ECHP), while “family responsibilities” inhibited 40 percent of women (ages 20–59) in 2000 (according to the LFS [Eurostat 1983–2008]).
- ²¹ The remaining source of childcare is interfamily solidarity from grandmothers, which may be assumed constant through the period.
- ²² An interesting difference is that the dummy for presence of older, school-age children becomes statistically significant and negative in 2001; this could indicate that once women drop out of the labor market they find it difficult to get back in.
- ²³ This reversal caught both society and policymakers by surprise (on the issue of attitudes, see Anna Triandafyllidou [2000], and on the gradual formation of “migration policy” see Anna Triandafyllidou [2005]). Policy has been designed to

cover the needs of the original majority of migrants – men; so it is not only male oriented but also family oriented, adopting a patriarchal approach towards migrants. This stands in contrast with the trend for the feminisation of migration (Maria Liapi and Anna Vouyioukas 2006).

- ²⁴ Due to their irregular status, the total number of immigrants is probably greater than in official statistics. Rossetos Fakiolas (2000) estimated that migrants not enumerated in 2000 were 400,000 persons.
- ²⁵ Lianos applied Joseph G. Altonji and David Card (1991) type regressions.
- ²⁶ Research on migrants in services to Greek households has taken off only recently (Helen Kambouri 2007; Iordanis Psimmenos and Christoforos Skamnakis 2008; Efthymios Papataxiarchis, Penelope Topali, and Angeliki Athanasopoulou 2008; Antigone Lyberaki 2009a).
- ²⁷ Social protection is skewed heavily towards pensions, which makes it largely irrelevant to immigrants' needs, especially given that pension benefits are generally not transferable internationally. System fragmentation allows immigrants to "purchase" health insurance coverage at minimal cost in terms of contributions (Tinios 2003).
- ²⁸ See Violetta Hionidou (2005) and Pothiti Hantzaroula (2005) on the history of domestic service in Greece.
- ²⁹ Between 15 and 23 years of contributions lead to the same pension. The disincentives are presumably stronger for workers who may not plan to stay in Greece after retirement age to collect their pension.
- ³⁰ Angeliki Athanasopoulou (2008) found that Albanian cleaners moved from live-in "3Cs status" (cleaning, cooking, caring) to shorter hours of "cleaning only" for many employers, near their homes.
- ³¹ Not all employers are employed. The description of the typical case does not rule out the existence of employers who do not work outside of the home.
- ³² These findings are in line with the probit reported in the Appendix and in Lianos's (2003) econometric findings. Even in eldercare the locus of decision may still lie with a younger female relative.
- ³³ In the context of SHARE (2004), Nordic countries include Sweden, Denmark, and the Netherlands. Continental Europe refers to France, Belgium, Austria, and Germany, while Southern Europe includes Italy, Spain, and Greece. For a fuller analysis of these points see Antigone Lyberaki, Tassos Philalithis, and Platon Tinios (2009).
- ³⁴ Recent estimates of childcare provision in Greece suggest that coverage remains below 10 percent for children younger than 3 years of age, while 60 percent of children between 3 and 6 years enroll in preschool centers (Maria Karamessini 2007). A further problem is that the operation schedule of childcare institutions does not match business hours.
- ³⁵ The structural framework of care services for the elderly in Greece is nominally "tripartite" public services, NGOs and informal care, besides the family (Aris Sissouras, Maria Ketsetzopoulou, Nikos Bouzas, Evi Fagadaki, Olga Papaliou, and Aliki Fakoura 2002). In recent years, a public program called "Help At Home" was introduced, which caters to care needs. However, the spread of the program is still narrow and therefore is unlikely to affect labor market magnitudes (Ministry of Labour and Social Security 2003).
- ³⁶ Residential care, calculated as the availability per 100 inhabitants over 65 years of age, accounted for 0.5 percent in Greece against 2 percent in Italy and 13 percent in Denmark (Bettio and Plantenga 2004).
- ³⁷ Personal care is defined as help in dressing, bathing or showering, eating, getting in or out of bed, or using the toilet.
- ³⁸ The employment of migrants to assist elderly persons has become widespread in rural areas, where evidence from recent research suggests that nearly 20 percent of all

households employed migrants for domestic and care services (Kasimis and Papadopoulos 2005). A legacy of the rural–urban migration of the 1960s and 1970s is the large number of “stranded elderly” in the countryside, whose offspring migrated to the towns.

- ³⁹ There are at least ten such boarding arrangements in Athens, at prices ranging around half the wage of a live-in.
- ⁴⁰ As their stay in Greece is prolonged, there emerge instances of entrepreneurial initiatives among cleaning ladies in the informal market of services to the households. Headed often by a migrant woman with an established good reputation and a broad network of connections, informal quasi-enterprises get started, with the head of the network acting as the guarantor of high quality service provision and trustworthiness.
- ⁴¹ Close to the minimum wage, between €650 and €900 per month for full-time equivalent work. Such services are often part time.
- ⁴² The minimum social insurance contribution corresponds to the minimum wage; as many domestic workers either work part time or are paid less than minimum, it was felt that the high non-wage costs were a barrier to the regularization of migrants’ work. The new insurance category names domestic and care work specifically.
- ⁴³ If 20 percent of immigrants work in domestic services, their number would be >200,000. Assuming that one-third of those work full time, then 130,000 have multiple employers. If 50 percent work for two or more households, we arrive at 15–20 percent. Alternatively, extrapolating from SHARE (2004), the percentage of households (with at least one member 50 years or older) seeking to meet their care needs from the market also arrives at approximately 20 percent.

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APPENDIX

Table A1 Probit marginal and impact effects for the determinants of participation in the labor market

<i>Participation in the labor market:</i>		
<i>Married women age 18–59, Greece</i>	<i>1995</i>	<i>2001</i>
Age 18–29	-0.0123 (0.0354)	-0.1093* (0.0445)
Age 30–4	<i>f</i>	<i>f</i>
Age 35–44	0.0131 (0.0314)	0.0039 (0.0385)
Age 45–54	-0.0831** (0.0355)	-0.0871** (0.0428)
Age 55–59	-0.2377*** (0.0372)	-0.2083*** (0.0476)
Households with no children and households with children over age 14	<i>f</i>	<i>f</i>
Households with at least one child less than age 6	-0.1048*** (0.0396)	-0.0466 (0.0477)
Households with two or more children with at least one under age 6	-0.1550*** (0.0325)	-0.1267*** (0.0418)
Households with one or more children over age 6	0.0127 (0.0262)	-0.0826*** (0.0312)
Higher education	0.2663*** (0.0269)	0.3499*** (0.0286)
Secondary education	<i>f</i>	<i>f</i>
Lower education	-0.0278 (0.0241)	-0.0802*** (0.0261)
Northern Greece	0.0868*** (0.0241)	0.0067 (0.0310)
Attica	<i>f</i>	<i>f</i>
Central Greece	0.1758*** (0.0256)	0.0634 (0.0337)
Aegean Islands and Crete	0.0532 (0.0322)	0.1072*** (0.0378)
Number of obs.	2971	2056
Pseudo- R^2	0.0644	0.0756

Notes: ***, **, and * denote statistical significance using two-tailed tests at the 1, 5, and 10 percent level, respectively. *f* denotes reference category. Standard errors are reported in brackets.

Source: Eurostat (1995–2001) data.